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Still Fighting God in the Public Arena: Does Europe
Pursue the Separation of Religion and State Too
Devoutly or Is It Saying It Does Without Really
Meaning It?
Vanja-Ivan Savić*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some scholars argue that whereas the United States is religious,
Europe is secular. Peter Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas argue
that while religion in America has its own special and important role,
political Europe (Western Europe in particular) seeks a secular
environment, but in reality is actually anti-religious. 1 It is paradoxical
that the cradle of Christianity has sought to become its funeral
home, at least as it relates to public manifestations of religious
identity. 2 At the same time, Christianity, which was exported to the
New World, flourished, at least in the formal sense. Political systems
in Europe are developing a more secularist approach and have begun
framing their legal systems based on this developed secularism. 3
Some European governments found that secularism can be a great

* Vanja-Ivan Savić, LL.M., M.Sc., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Law, University of Zagreb;
Visiting Scholar, Northwestern University; and Guest Professor, DePaul University. I wish to
thank Brigham Young University Professor David M. Kirkham for all his support and also
Molly L. Bloem, an excellent law student from DePaul University, for her valuable technical
support and advice. This paper is part of my work on the project, Religious and Secular State,
conducted at University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law.
1. PETER BERGER, GRACE DAVIE & EFFIE FOKAS, RELIGIOUS AMERICA, SECULAR
EUROPE? 9–21 (2008).
2. The idea that there should be “no religion in the public square” is present in
movements which define separation of church and state as a complete absence of religious life
in public life and institutions; this becomes an absence of spiritual life in everyday life, which is
a form of aggressive secularism that does not recognize that religion and its morals are integral
part of society’s existence. For example, in France, the Christian identity of the nation is
neglected when laws are made. In fact, many churches are considered state-owned, such that
church authorities are just “using” the facilities. The key of the church is in the hands of the
village mayor, not the priest.
3. Jean-Paul Willaime, Towards a Recognition and Dialogue Secularism in Europe,
2015 BYU L. REV. 779, 782–87.
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mechanism for defending against the “other” and the “different”
while also keeping the idea of human rights alive—human rights, but
without any religious, and sometimes ethnic, flavor.
The latter is particularly the case in France, with the recent bans
on religious clothing. 4 The stubborn insistence for such bans did not
result so much from a desire to preserve the secular identity of the
French Republic as it did from fear of the growing Muslim
population. 5 Banning public displays of crucifixes and Jewish kippas
were just side effects of the religious clothing ban. 6
The issue is complicated. On the one hand, protecting human
rights is necessary, and on the other, protecting the public morals
and public order of the system in which we live requires protecting
some traditional values since these values shape the system itself. By
accepting an ideology of absolute freedom, that freedom will
challenge the rules of the society in which we live. Society is tasked
with seeking a path to coexistence. This coexistence should be a
thoughtful balance of human rights and individual freedoms on one
hand (including religious freedoms), and the majority’s personal
morals coupled with the de facto morals of the state on the other.
Human rights do not entail rule by the minority. However, the
governing majority should, by virtue of its power and position, do
everything it can to protect the minority and its continued existence.
This Article does not assert that states should be religiously driven,
but that states should be religiously aware.
With the use of three European cases (Italy, France, and
Croatia), this Article will prove three things. First, there is a
perpetual fight against the sacred in the public sphere. Secularist
states are too aggressive in their approach toward religion.
Secularism’s unwillingness to respect the religious components of
citizens could produce serious problems within the functioning of
4. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on Forbidding Concealing the Face in
Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18, 344. See S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur.
Ct. H.R.
5. See Saïla Ouald Chaib, S.A.S. v. France: A Short Summary of an Interesting Hearing,
STRASBOURG OBSERVERS, Nov. 29, 2013, http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/11/29/sa-s-v-france-a-short-summary-of-an-interesting-hearing/.
6. See French Scarf Ban Comes into Force, BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3619988.stm.
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the state system and cause unwanted public response. Second,
religion is important for public morals and orders. In spite of this
fight, courts, and therefore states, are not in a position to reject the
spiritual elements of their nations, at least for that tiny part that is
connected with culture and tradition and therefore desirable. Finally,
there is a way to prevent secularism from driving religion out entirely
while still achieving its goal of preserving minority rights.
The Article will accomplish this in the following way. Part II of
this Article addresses each of the problems caused by a disrespect for
religion. Part III proposes a solution to these problems. Part IV then
addresses three examples that show these problems as well as how
the proposed solution can fix them: Lautsi v. Italy, S.A.S. v. France,
and the Croatian Constitutional Marriage Amendment. Part V
concludes by summarizing how Europe can find a balance between
fulfilling the demands for human rights and preserving the
majority’s morals.
II. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY SECULARISM
Secular states that ban public religiosity have four major issues.
First, they forget that religious norms are part of the state’s public
and legal existence. Second, they are removing religion from the
legal system. Third, they do not understand the role of religious
concepts and traditions in the lives of their citizens. Fourth, they lose
the ability to discourage behavior that is outside the
acceptable norm.
First, when playing solely by secularism’s rules, the state ignores
that religious guidelines are more than just a part of history and
tradition; they are actual living pieces of culture and, therefore, part
of the state’s public and legal existence. 7 By diminishing religion,
7. If you ignore that religion even exists, you do not recognize its influence. One
example of the influence of religion on states is found in the idea of the presumption of
innocence, which is an old norm of Canon Law. See Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until
Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim, 63 JURIST: STUD. CHURCH L. & MINISTRY 106,
113–16 (2003). Another example is found in Alsace-Moselle, where the head of state appoints
the Catholic Archbishop of Strasbourg and the Bishop of Metz by decree. NORMAN DOE, LAW
AND RELIGION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 128 n.111 (2011). Monogamy
in family law is the product of Christian moral thought. See Michael E. Price, Why We Think
Monogamy Is Normal: How Polygamy Became an “Exotic Exception,” PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Sept. 9, 2011, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/darwin-eternity/201109/why-we-
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states contradict themselves when dealing with human rights and
religious freedom—rules initially set by the states themselves. This
Article does not discuss the model upon which states should build
their own attitudes towards religion, but whatever the model, the
attitude of the state must be much more accepting of religion than
many secular nations are for two reasons. First, religion is significant
because it is an important building block of the nation’s culture, on
which legal systems are based. 8 Thus, it needs to be acknowledged
and supported, not ignored or torn down. Second, the religious
attitudes and needs of the citizens should not be undermined, but
should be protected as a principle of human rights. 9 As this paper
will show, the current attitude of many secular nations undermines
these needs. These should not be undermined but should be
protected. By taking care to incorporate and balance these two
elements, states can work to accomplish a secularism that is aware
that law is a product of both culture (a democratic principle) and
minority protection (a human rights principle). Importantly, the
principles of democracy and human rights are not mutually exclusive;
on the contrary, they should go hand-in-hand.
Second, the current secular governments focus on detaching the
legal system from religion and religious groups. This detachment, in
turn, creates a “new religion,” in the form of secularism, deemed
adequate for all. 10 On the surface, secularism appears to give similar
rights to all, regardless of religious belief. In fact, however,
secularism gives greater rights to nonbelievers. Herein lies the
problem—if not a moral problem, then a constitutional and legal
problem. The problem is multilayered because, in legal and political

think-monogamy-is-normal. It is also thought to be a product of Judaic Ashkenazi tradition.
Avraham N.Z. Roth, On the History of Monogamy Among the Jews, in JEWISH STUDIES IN
MEMORY OF MICHAEL GUTTMANN 114–36 (David Samuel Löwinger ed., 1946).
8. See Willaime, supra note 3, at 801–03 nn.148–56.
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. RES. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”). See also, Aldir Guedes
Soriano, Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious Freedom, 2013 BYU L. REV.
581 (2014).
10. See Miroslav Volf, A Voice of One’s Own: Public Faith in a Pluralistic World, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 274–75 (Thomas Banchoff ed., 2007).
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theory, population is one of the crucial elements of the state, along
with territory and sovereign power. If any of these elements are
missing, the state does not exist. 11 Therefore, when numerous
religious beliefs exist in the same population, the state should grant
greater rights for believers according to democratic principles. 12
Additionally, European legal systems are formulated on rules derived
from religious norms such as Canon Law, 13 making it impossible to
detach the legal systems from the cultural structures upon which the
system is built.
Third, secular governments often do not understand the role of
religious concepts and traditions in shaping the identity of its
population. These governments want to expel religion from the
national identity of the Nation, not only politically, but also
ethnically. Secularism becomes the major “religion” which refuses to
follow the free will of majority. These types of governments proclaim
a secularist state in the name of human rights, requiring a complete
absence of God in the public sphere. These governments do not
realize that in creating this secularist state, they erase the identities of
the citizens. This in turn leads to the creation of national identities
without the free will of all of the states’ subjects. For example,
celebrating religious holidays or displaying crucifixes in classrooms
means more than the “ordinary” and “private” faith of the states’
citizens; 14 religious beliefs are beliefs that constitute the values of the
11. Svetomir Skaric, The Case of “the former Yugoslave Repulic of Macedonia,” in 22
SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATION-STATE
IN EUROPE AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY 318 (European Commission for Democracy
through Law, 1997).
12. The rights of any particular majority group are, in a sense, “bigger” than the rights
of the members of a minority. For instance, religious requests, which are transferred into law
provide some specific rights reserved just for the followers of the majority group; some rights
are produced to make the majority comfortable and feel “at home” and some rights are made
to accommodate the majority’s desires. In that respect, it might happen that the minority’s
rights would be secondary. The challenge is to find an appropriate balance between the rights
of the majority and the requests of the minority.
13. For example, the presumption of innocence is a Canon Law norm and a typical
example of a norm deeply rooted in public legal systems and frameworks: Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat (the burden of proof is on he who declares, not on he who denies). See
French Scarf Ban Comes into Force, supra note 6.
14. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47. Lautsi is a legendary
case held in front of the European Court of Human Rights in which the majority of judges
decided that crosses in the classroom of public schools in Italy did not affect parents’ right to
ensure that the education and teaching of their children is “in conformity with their own
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nations. In accordance with those beliefs, citizens seek a place and a
government that acknowledges, respects, and follows the values by
which they wish to live. By ignoring the values of the majority, state
and legal systems seriously endanger democratic concepts
of governance.
Finally, policy makers do not realize that by rejecting their own
cultural and legal roots, they diminish their options for rejecting
unwanted behavior on the basis of cultural noncompliance. Secularly
driven governments usually decide to follow human rights law and
proclaim that all people are equal and have the right to a particular
identity. However, problems arise when the government encounters
identities and behaviors that do not “fit” the government’s
perceptions of living within the public body. Sometimes the
government refrain from admitting these perceptions are based on
the cultural reality within the nation it leads. 15 The government then
uses the same concept that they rejected and secularism becomes the
creed of the state, leaving no place for religion. Secularism,
therefore, becomes a church without an actual church. For instance,
when the French Republic increased regulations on religious symbols
in public schools for fear of Muslim extremism, this resulted in
stringent regulations for all faiths, which became collateral victims,
leaving no place for religious expression. 16
Secularism’s rejection of public religiosity causes all of these
problems. Yet, as the next section will discuss, it can still achieve its
goal of protecting minorities without pushing out religion.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
One way to remedy these problems is for secularism to transform
its position from dogma to dialogue by inspiring a discussion of all

religious and philosophical convictions.” Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Protocol No. 1], available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/
html/009.htm. See also Grégor Puppinck, The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A synthesis, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 873, 875 (2012). Crosses are a “passive” symbol that represents tradition and, therefore,
do not actively influence someone’s quality of life. Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at ¶ 16.
15. See Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 1.1–1.6.
16. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
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peoples with understanding and respect toward the spiritual identity
of the culture, which will lead to greater public morals and order.
Problems arise when a group seeking the rights provided by the
system do not respect the system that provides them. In particular,
there is grave importance for those seeking the rights of the system
to acknowledge religion’s importance to that system. Arguing that
religion does not form public morals, even in today’s world, is a
fallacy. Lawyers must do their part: they must shape the law to fit the
religion and culture within the nation. Law should be a tool for
religious cohabitation; though there are arguments to be made
regarding how to achieve this coexistence, whether from the top
down or the bottom up. 17 One must act wherever one is situated,
which means to fight for religious coexistence regardless of whether
one is on the top or bottom.
For Europe, its situation presents unique challenges in
comparison to America. In his most recent book, legal philosopher
Brian Leiter 18 discusses religious tolerance, including the importance
of spirituality. 19 He describes philosophical dimensions of court
rulings that could work in America but not in Europe, where
established secularism holds a firm place within the division of
powers. 20 Although Leiter critically examines elements of religion
and why it should have a special place within the legal system, the
issue that religion is a phenomenon that addresses questions of
ultimate reality 21 speaks of a spiritual element that is very important
to human beings and should not be marginalized. Societies that did
not realize the importance of spirituality (where it was important, of
course) did not succeed in a new de-spiritualization of society in the

17. The top-down approach is that society should be changed from inside, slowly and
evolutionally, and then there is a law which will just state and describe the “real” situation on
the ground which will be already achieved. The bottom-up approach is when political elites
decide to achieve something, they can and should use the law to shape the behavior and
protect what is perceived as endangered. See, e.g., infra Section IV.C.1. (showing a bottom up
approach where intellectual and political elites, who were conservative, started collecting
signatures in order to change Croatia’s Constitution).
18. Professor of Jurisprudence and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human
Values, University of Chicago Law School.
19. See generally BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013).
20. Id. at 92–133.
21. Id. at 47–52. “Religious beliefs involve, explicitly or implicitly a metaphysics of
ultimate reality.” Id.
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form of radical secularism. 22 Accepting the role of religion and not
insisting on its passive place could lead to a new, contemporary form
of religious tolerance that will lead to better problem solving,
especially in complex religious and ethnic societies. Furthermore, the
American perspective on religion may differ from the European one
for the basic reason that the American state was founded on the
grounds of establishing religious freedoms for those who were
persecuted for it, and as such it has a “formative” role in the
constitutional sense. 23
Another issue is that countries under communist/socialist rule
somehow preserved a connection with Christianity in a different way
than was done in the West. 24 Paradoxically, suppression and living in
catacombs actually helped spiritual life flourish. 25 Westerners softened
their attitudes toward their Christian roots and conformismbleaching spiritual foundations of Europe much more than
secularism did. 26 Therefore, it is no surprise that traditional countries
like Italy and Spain moved away from their Christian foundations;
France perhaps went the furthest of all. 27 Principles of secularism
therefore were not accepted equally well in Central and Eastern
Europe. The recent constitutional referendum in the newest

22. See Tariq Modood, Is There a Crisis of Secularism in Western Europe?, 73 SOC. OF
RELIGION 130, 132 (2011) (In Great Britain, traditional religion is being replaced with no
religion or new religious and spiritual trends, but these do not conflict with
political secularism).
23. Washington, the first president of the United States, showed strong support of
religion, noting that “religion and morality are indispensable supports,” the “firmest props of
the duties of men and citizens,” and “a necessary spring of popular government.” George
Washington, Washington’s Farewell Address (1796), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/washing.asp.
24. See, e.g., Victor Yelensky, Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era:
The Case of Ukraine (with Special References to Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues), 2002
BYU L. Rev. 453 (2002). Other countries include Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, and Romania from the former European Eastern Bloc.
25. See generally JASON WITTENBERG, CRUCIBLES OF POLITICAL LOYALTY: CHURCH
INSTITUTIONS AND ELECTORAL CONTINUITY IN HUNGARY (2006); CYRIL E. BLACK ET AL.,
REBIRTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE WORLD WAR II (2d ed. 1999).
26. See ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 29–37 (2008).
27. See, e.g., C.C. tit. IV, ch. 1, art. 42 (Spain); Loi 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant
le marriage aux couples de personnes de même sexe [Law 2013-404 of May 17, 2013 opening
marriage to same sex couples], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 18, 2013, p. 8253.
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European Union (EU) state, Croatia, show all the complexity and
even the drama of the clashes of cultural identification. 28 This Article
will demonstrate how Europe deals with these problems today and
will try to show where God resides within the old and new
statehoods of the Old Continent.
But as this Article will show, there is one solution that applies
uniformly to all of these cases: the Neutrality, but Tradition Principle
(“NBT Principle”) and the Tolerance but Tradition Principle (“TBT
Principle”). The NBT Principle incorporates tradition, both current
and accumulated, while also including all concerns for human rights
as standards of humankind. The TBT Principle seeks to respect
tradition while tolerating differences. It benefits all parties: the
majority feels comfortable in surroundings that fit their cultural
needs, and the minority feels protected by the majority in a defined
and honest dialogue.
There are five steps to applying these two principles. First, the
state must acknowledge that religion is an important part of the
cultural life of citizens (Awareness). Second, it must also
acknowledge that religion has shaped the culture (Foundations).
Third, it must secure a minimum of the prevailing set of norms of
the majority by law (Democratic Principle). Fourth, it must give the
maximum possible rights to the minority by law (Human Rights
Principle). Fifth, it must balance between minority and majority
rights (Cohabitation). As each of these three examples are explained,
these principles will present a solution to each of their
major challenges.
IV. THREE EXAMPLES
A. The Importance of Lautsi in European Human Rights
This first case shows how important public religiosity is for a
nation and how courts can recognize its importance within the
individual context of each nation. Lautsi and Others v. Italy is one of
the most important cases for religion in recent European legal
history. It was decided on March 18, 2011, by the Grand Chamber

28.

See infra Part IV.C.
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of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 29 It is the
longest-running case in ECtHR history. For the purposes of this
Article, the most important dimension of the Lautsi case is how it
shows the two different sides in the debate on the European
continent over religion and cultural positions that has led to what are
popularly called “cultural wars.” 30
This section explores the case, starting first with the claims and
the holdings of the lower courts before proceeding to the holding of
the ECtHR and then finishing with an analysis of the ideas found in
that holding.
1. Claims and lower court holdings suggestions?
In Lautsi, the Grand Chamber of the Court decided 15 to 2 that
a crucifix hanging on the wall in a public school classroom did not
violate the Convention’s provisions on the freedom of religion,
namely those set up in Article 2 of the First Protocol, which
guarantee the right to education, 31 and Article 9 of Protocol No. 14

29. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47; see also Puppinck,
supra note 14. Lautsi is a landmark case and lawyers in law and religion should always return
to it when considering the views of the supreme judicial body concerning human rights in
Europe. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is a pan-national and supra-national
European court. The ECHR was established by the European Convention of Human Rights,
which entered into force on September 3, 1953 and is effective in all European states
excluding Belarus. Even countries of Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey) are
signatories of the Convention. Russia is also a member and has a representative judge sitting
on the Court. ECHR, therefore, has a wider range of influence than any other treaty
originating from the bodies of the European Union. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf.
Discussing the Lautsi case, however, has become more challenging since the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decided S.A.S. v. France. S.A.S. v. France,
App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. This case and its consequences are discussed in
greater detail in another section dedicated to the recent development of secularism in France.
See infra text accompanying notes 49−97.
30. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, IS THERE A CULTURE
WAR?: A DIALOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 1–9 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & Michael
Cromartie eds., 2006).
31. Protocol No. 1, supra note 14, at art. 2. “No person shall be denied the right to
education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in
conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.” Id. The issue presented
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(freedom of thought, conscience and religion). 32 There were also
claims that Article 14, which provides protection against
discrimination, had been violated; 33 however, those were
subsequently dismissed for being connected and consumed by the
previous (or as the court said, non-existing) violations. Although in
the first instance the Chamber court ruled that there have been
violations of the aforementioned articles, 34 in the second instance the
Grand Chamber took a completely different approach when deciding
what today could be considered one of the most influential cases in
modern European legal history. Informatively, the Grand Chamber
described all the stages through which the case passed, both in Italy
and Europe, which describe the case in a more cultural context.
On 17 March 2005, the Administrative Court dismissed the
application. After ruling that Article 118 of the royal decree of 30
April 1924 and Article 119 of the royal decree of 26 April 1928
were still in force and emphasizing that ‘the principle of the secular
nature of the State [was] now part of the legal heritage of Europe
and the western democracies’, it held that the presence of crucifixes
in State-school classrooms, regard being had to the meaning it
should be understood to convey, did not offend against that
here raises many important questions connected with the right of the parent to raise children
in accordance with their own “religions and philosophical convictions.” In that sense, the
judges of the Grand Chamber were right when they stated that the appellant’s opinions were
philosophical values and therefore could be treated as religion. By accepting the appellant’s
arguments, the majority, the Christian and Catholic parents, could feel that there was an
“abuse of the minority position.” For more about this topic and further explanations by the
Court, see infra text accompanying notes 41–64.
32. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Protocol No. 14 art. 9, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S No. 194, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, [hereinafter
Convention], available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm.
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice
and observance. . . . Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”).
33. “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.” Id. at art. 14. This article is often used in conjunction with the
provisions of other regulations of the Convention.
34. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 ¶ 49.
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principle. It took the view, in particular, that although the crucifix
was undeniably a religious symbol, it was a symbol of Christianity
in general rather than of Catholicism alone, so that it served as a
point of reference for other creeds. It went on to say that the
crucifix was a historical and cultural symbol, possessing on that
account an ‘identity-linked value’ for the Italian people, in that it
‘represent[ed] in a way the historical and cultural development
characteristic of [Italy] and in general of the whole of Europe, and
[was] a good synthesis of that development’. The Administrative
Court further held that the crucifix should also be considered a
symbol of a value system underpinning the Italian Constitution. 35

The protocol for applying cases to the ECHR requests that the
applicant exhaust all domestic institutions where he or she can seek
help. The reasons for this include filtering cases so that only the most
relevant cases remain and preventing inundating the Court with
numerous cases that could be decided at the lower level(s).
Therefore, the Italian Supreme Administrative Court 36 became
involved, essentially confirming that the “presence of crucifixes in
State-school classrooms has its legal basis.” 37 This decision also
assured the public that secularism shapes both the law and cultural
customs, which are reflected in legal order:
35. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. The administrative court wrote extensively about the cultural meaning
and value of the Cross in European Culture. The court explained: “At this stage, the Court
must observe, although it is aware that it is setting out along a rough and in places slippery
path, that Christianity, and its older brother Judaism—at least since Moses and certainly in the
Talmudic interpretation—have placed tolerance towards others and protection of human
dignity at the center of their faith. Singularly, Christianity—for example through the wellknown and often misunderstood ‘Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and
unto . . .’—through its strong emphasis placed on love for one’s neighbor, and even more
through the explicit predominance given to charity over faith itself, contains in substance those
ideas of tolerance, equality and liberty which form the basis of the modern secular State, and of
the Italian State in particular.” Id. at 5. Additionally, the court commented that “[t]he link
between Christianity and liberty implies a logical historical coherence which is not immediately
obvious—like a river in a karst landscape which has only recently been explored, precisely
because for most of its course it flows underground—partly because in the constantly changing
relations between the States and Churches of Europe it is much easier to see the numerous
attempts by the Churches to meddle in matters of State, and vice versa, just like the frequent
occasions on which Christian ideals have been abandoned, though officially proclaimed, in the
quest for power, or on which governments and religious authorities have clashed, sometimes
violently.” Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
36. Consiglio di Stato is the court of last appeal in administrative matters in Italy.
37. Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 16.
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As with any symbol, one can impose on or attribute to the crucifix
various contrasting meanings; one can even deny its symbolic value
and make it a simple trinket having artistic value at the most.
However, a crucifix displayed in a classroom cannot be considered
a trinket, a decorative feature, nor as an adjunct to worship. Rather,
it should be seen as a symbol capable of reflecting the remarkable
sources of the civil values referred to above, values which define
secularism in the State’s present legal order. 38

The Supreme Administrative Court accepted most of the lower
court’s reasoning, holding that the sign of the Cross represented the
framework, culture, and values of the Italian nation. This reasoning
was particularly apparent when the court explained that the Cross
symbolized acceptance of others, especially those from outside
Europe. 39 The presence of religious symbols varies from country to
country in Europe—no rule sets norms on an international level
within either the European Union or Europe in general. For
instance, France expressly forbids the appearance of religious symbols
in public spaces. However, Austria and some states in Germany—
Bayern for instance—merely request it, 40 and many states have no

38. Id. (quoting Consiglio di Stato, 2006 Judgment No. 556).
39. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Consiglio di Stato, 2006 Judgment No. 556, at §§ 12.6, 13.4)
(“It must be emphasised that the symbol of the crucifix, thus understood, now possesses,
through its references to the values of tolerance, a particular scope in consideration of the fact
that at present Italian State schools are attended by numerous pupils from outside the
European Union, to whom it is relatively important to transmit the principles of openness to
diversity and the refusal of any form of fundamentalism—whether religious or secular—which
permeate our system. Our era is marked by the ferment resulting from the meeting of different
cultures with our own, and to prevent that meeting from turning into a collision it is
indispensable to reaffirm our identity, even symbolically, especially as it is characterized
precisely by the values of respect for the dignity of each human being and of universal
solidarity . . . . The cross, as the symbol of Christianity, can therefore not exclude anyone
without denying itself; it even constitutes in a sense the universal sign of the acceptance of and
respect for every human being as such, irrespective of any belief, religious or other, which he
or she may hold.”).
40. The German Constitutional Court ruled that Crucifixes in the public classroom,
even in Bavaria (Bayern), are not permissible. Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal
Constitutional Court], Aug. 10, 1995, 32, Entscheidungen des bundesverfassungsgerichts
(Ger.). This ruling shocked many and caused unprecedented public reaction. Stephen Kinzer,
Crucifix Ruling Angers Bavarians, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/08/23/world/crucifix-ruling-angers-bavarians.html. The court, realizing the negative
effect of the ruling, issued a subsequent opinion stating that Crucifixes may remain so long as
parents do not object, or children of other creeds are put in separate classrooms. See Deutsche
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specific legal rules on the issue. Interestingly, the Grand Chamber
held that the ECtHR in its first instance was wrongly decided. It
disagreed that the Cross on the wall would influence “vulnerable”
children and that the “state ha[s] a duty to uphold confessional
neutrality in public education” even if it meant violating rights of the
religious majority. 41
The moral and ethical values of a nation cannot be separated
from religious norms or even feelings. In the Lautsi case, the Italian
government made specific reference to this argument by pointing to
the Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria judgment of September 20,
1994. 42 In Otto-Preminger, a large margin of deference was afforded
to Austria when a movie was forbidden to be played in Austrian
cinemas because it offended the feelings of Austrian Catholics—the

Welle, German High Court Crucifix Ruling, DW: TODAY IN HISTORY, http://
www.todayinhistory.de/index.php?what=thmanu&manu_id=1545&tag=10&monat=
8&year=2002&dayisset=1&lang=en (last visited September 4, 2015). This was one of the
most controversial decisions of the Court.
41. Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 31. This is decision of the
Court of the first instance. The Italian Government insisted that neutrality is not same thing as
secularism. “The Government also criticised the Chamber’s judgment for deriving from the
concept of confessional ‘neutrality’ a principle excluding any relations between the State and a
particular religion, whereas neutrality required the public administrative authorities to take all
religions into account. The judgment was accordingly based on confusion between ‘neutrality’
(an ‘inclusive concept’) and ‘secularism’ (an ‘exclusive concept’). Moreover, in the
Government’s view, neutrality meant that States should refrain from promoting not only a
particular religion but also atheism, ‘secularism’ on the State’s part being no less problematic
than proselytising by the State. The Chamber’s judgment was thus based on a
misunderstanding and amounted to favouring an irreligious or antireligious approach of which
the applicant, as a member of the Union of atheists and rationalist agnostics, was asserted to be
a militant supporter.” Id. at ¶ 35. It should be stressed that atheism is also to be considered a
“religious” identification. Although it does not include believing in a supreme being, it does
include believing that One does not exist: so atheism is not ‘religious’ by itself but holds
religious attributes. There is a recent example of an Afghani immigrant seeking asylum in the
UK on the grounds of being atheist. The UK Government granted him asylum on the grounds
of religious persecution (persecution caused by religious identity of the applicant). This was
heavily followed by the British press. See Owen Bowcott, Afghan Atheist Granted UK Asylum,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/
14/afghan-atheist-uk-asylum. It is also interesting that European laws (EU Laws) say nothing
about family law issues, the majority of which are connected to religious norms. Thus Europe
recognizes the special position of family law and silently declares its connection to moral and
ethical values.
42. Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 37 (citing Otto-PremingerInstitut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 1994 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
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vast majority of Austrian citizens. 43 The fact that the movie had been
shown in movie theatres and was hurting the feelings of the majority
of the Catholic population was sufficient reasoning for the decision
of the Court when the blasphemous movie was forbidden. 44 The
Italian Government used this case to show that other European
States had similar circumstances and that the Court provided similar
protection to the cultural values of the state. In Lautsi, the
government’s major objection is asserted in the following comment:
On the contrary, the Court should acknowledge and protect
national traditions and the prevailing popular feeling, and leave
each State to maintain a balance between opposing interests.
Moreover, it was the Court’s case-law that school curricula or
provisions establishing the preponderance of the majority religion
did not in themselves point to undue influence on the part of the
State or attempted indoctrination, and that the Court should
respect constitutional traditions and principles relating to relations
between the State and religions—including in the present case the
particular approach to secularism which prevailed in Italy—and take
into account the context of each State. 45

2. The court’s holding
At the European Court for Human Rights, the case was very
simple. The applicants argued that a crucifix in the classroom
represented the “despotism of majority.” 46 The Italian Government,
however, claimed that removing the crosses would be an “abuse of a
minority position.” 47 The final decision was 15 to 2 in favor of
crucifixes in the classrooms. 48 The court determined that the crucifix,
as a “passive symbol,” does not actively harm other’s rights of
religious freedom and equality. 49

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 1994 Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id.
Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 72.
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The central questions in these types of cases are: Do we believe
the secular identity of the State to be protected by the Constitution?
Do we accept the historical and cultural dimension of religion? Does
religion have a social role within Society? Many of these questions
can be answered with this insight: religious symbols could be seen as
both religious and cultural. That line, of course, is thin and delicate.
But if we draw it, we maintain the option that the State and Society
could be both secularly and culturally shaped. It is important to see
what technique the Court uses to determine which values deserve
special protection and how the Court attempts to draw that thin and
delicate line.
The Court sought to draw this line by using the “margin of
appreciation” doctrine (or “range of discretion” doctrine). This
doctrine is defined by the ECtHR and widely used for cases where
specific protective elements are found in the laws. Under
interpretative opinions of the Council of Europe and ECtHR, “the
term ‘margin of appreciation’ refers to the space for manoeuvre that
the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities, in
fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights.” 50 This establishes that even in the most democratic
countries where the freedom of expression standard is enviable, law
leaves a special place for the peculiarities of specific countries. Article
10.2 of the Convention mentions using “public morals” for setting
standards. 51 Thus, state law, viewed as an intrinsically normative
phenomena, is based on judgments of social reality and incorporates

50. See The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.echr.coe.int/
LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17 (2000).pdf (last visited Sept. 4,
2015). See also Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499. The
European Court justified the limitation of freedom of expression over the protection of public
morals. See generally HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
51. Convention, supra note 32, at art. 10.2. “The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Id.
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the statistical factors which require that the majority principle be
protected; factors which make up the cultural environment of a
particular state. It is important to realize that public morals also
make law. In that sense, the decision in the Lautsi case—by using the
margin of appreciation doctrine when the Court decided that the
presence of the cross cannot be disturbing to non-believers—reaffirmed the cultural element of public morals, which are also
responsible for the formation of law. 52
3. Analysis of Lautsi
There are some interesting comparisons to the U.S.
Establishment Clause cases which are valuable in understanding the
Lautsi case. Richard W. Garnett from Notre Dame University shared
interesting insights into how this case would turn out in the U.S.
when he discussed the Lautsi case before the decision of the Grand
Chamber. 53 He argues that, for the United States Supreme Court,
this would be an easy decision in which the justices would
unanimously invalidate it for First Amendment reasons. 54 But, he
also argues that the nature of the symbol would be important—he
mentions that a Christmas tree in a public space is a non-influential
symbol to non-Christians. 55 He is correct when he asserts that if
something would be in violation of a secular element of the state—
and protection of the First Amendment—it would be crucial to
know what kind of significance the symbol in question has to society.
He provides a few factors to consider: the length of time the symbol
has been in place, the artistic significance of the symbol, its political
significance, etc. 56 Even though he believes U.S. judges would decide
differently, this decision would be reached because of the different

52.
53.

Id. § 66.
Richard W. Garnett, Section III, in LECTURE PAPER 14: THE EUROPEAN COURT
VERSUS THE CRUCIFIX: A PANEL DISCUSSION 10 (The Nanovic Inst. Lecture Papers, A. James
McAdams ed., 2010), https://nanovic.nd.edu/assets/54613/crucifix_paper.pdf [hereinafter
LECTURE PAPER 14].
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 10–11.
56. Id. at 11.
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cultural structure of the United States. 57 Additionally, some issues
could be more difficult, like Nativity scenes displayed alongside
menorahs by the government. 58 He also mentions that it would not
be required for Los Angeles to change its name, but some towns
would have to remove crosses from their seals. 59
He argues “that most jurists are sensible enough to realize that
ours has been and remains a society that is comfortable with mild,
non-sectarian forms of ‘public religions,’ and that they should not
overreach.” 60 He notes that “if we err in one direction, we give
heckler’s veto to people who simply don’t like any religious imagery.
If we err in the other direction, we fall into unattractive and
unthinking deference of majorities.” 61 So, culture is important, as
well as public morals, on both sides of the Atlantic. Cultural
substance is the only thing that differs. America is, or at least has
been, a Protestant, and not a Catholic, country whose culture surely
determined public morals, which in turn were transformed into law. 62
Thus, the Lautsi case shows that law as a product of historical
context produces the framework which we call public morals and
public order (Awareness and Foundations Principles). This
framework exists despite the requests of governments, groups, or
individuals to have secular society detached from religion and
religious (moral) values. To be more precise, law and legal order
cannot—and should not—function without regard to what the
public response would be—public response being dependent on the
social puzzle of the values of a particular society (Democratic
Principle). The margin of appreciation doctrine assures that when
fighting over God, He stays in the public arena as long as His
presence is visible in social elements that form that society and its
normative structure. In other words, even if states or political parties
want changes, those changes cannot be of such dimension and range

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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that their application would mean the complete corrosion of the
system where they are applied.
In this light, secular norms (and attitudes) should not be so
aggressive that they undermine aspects of religious foundations that
establish law and society. In democratic societies, there should be a
place for everyone, which means that the majority should not be
excluded. Laws of culture, as long as those are laws of the land and
life, should be respected, even if secularism is a constitutional value
(Cohabitation Principle). Finding balance is the key. Having those
rules in mind, Swedes or Norwegians could keep their flags with the
symbol of the cross, and Americans could keep “in God we trust” on
their banknotes. There should be norms which are applicable to all
whether you’re talking about Provo or Manhattan 63 and whichever
different group is asked, regardless of territorial, religious, or other
cultural differences. It is impossible to cherish the products of the
European state’s historical development by merely accepting the
evolution of developing individual human rights without at the same
time respecting the twenty centuries of tradition in which that
evolution took place. 64
B. The Final Fall of the French Vail: S.A.S. v. France
One of the most controversial religious freedom issues is the
problem of religious clothing in France. On July 1, 2014, the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR decided S.A.S. v. France, which challenged
the French ban on wearing face coverings in public spaces. 65 As the
aim of this text is to show the importance of recognizing religious
elements in society on a different level from that which is (or would
like to be) accepted today, this Article will not go deeply into the
facts of this case, but will merely use the case and its sociological
development as additional proof that the ECtHR has a consistent
approach towards religion and law on European soil. This section
starts with a brief review of the case’s issues and arguments. It then
63. Id. at 14.
64. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (Bonello,
G., concurring).
65. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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deals with the context of the case by looking at French secularism. It
proceeds to the court’s holdings before finishing with a comparison
to the Dutch to show a better solution.
1. The case
The major question at issue was whether the decision of the
French republic to ban head coverings in public spaces was based on
the grounds of public order, gender equality, and protection of
secularism, or rather the protection of tradition, culture, and public
safety. 66 The non-governmental organization Open Society Justice
Initiative made interesting arguments that correctly pointed out that
these measures were made against Muslim customs and behavior:
This third-party intervener pointed out that the ban on the
full-face veil had been criticised within the Council of Europe and
that only France and Belgium had adopted such a blanket measure.
It emphasised [sic] that, even though the French and Belgian Laws
were neutral in their wording, their legislative history showed that
the intent was to target specifically the niqab and the burqa. 67

By not accepting the religious freedom of its citizens, the French
Republic falls into a contradictory and illogical situation in which, by
defending secularism, it acts as a protector of moral and even religious
practices that are shadowed by traditional values but that are formal
practices of the state, even if it does not recognize them as religious.
For example, some states protect the principle of “living together” or
things that are part of their foundational and valued nature, but do
not protect individual religious practices such as wearing a religious
veil. When kippas or crosses, which are also religious symbols or
necessities, were worn there were no complaints. The French Republic
protects public order on the same grounds—and in the same way—
that any religiously grounded country in the world would. France has
difficulty admitting that its public order, although secular, is based on
66. This was the notion of the non-governmental organization Open Society Justice
Initiative. See Written Comments of the Open Society Justice Initiative S.A.S. v. France, App.
No. 43835/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed July 10, 2012) § 22, available at http://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/sas-france-written-comments-20130423.pdf.
67. S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 102.
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particular values which derive their substance from the country’s
Judeo-Christian roots. Evidence of this is that questions about
protecting secularism (laïcité) by banning religious symbols were not
present in French legal history with populations of Christians or
Jewish believers, which brought skull heads and crosses into the public
sphere. But, when the Muslim population grew and started to
culturally shape the country, the Republic reacted—using secularism as
its religion in defense. Now that the former adversary, the Catholic
Church, is neutralized and does not present a “serious problem” after
the French Revolution in 1798, attention has shifted to the Muslim
community in France. Even if secular in their deepest beliefs, French
cultural circles must pretend that they completely left Christian
concepts and cultural values. This by itself would not be a problem,
except that when claiming absolute and pure secularism, they are at
the same time neglecting individual religious freedom and human
rights that are guaranteed by the freedom of religion clauses. In this
case, we face unfair discriminatory behavior aimed at one particular
group—Muslims.
In conclusion, the intervener argued that there was a European
consensus against bans on the wearing of the full-face veil in public.
It further stressed the fact that blanket bans were disproportionate
where less intrusive measures might be possible, that public order
justifications must be supported by concrete evidence, that
measures introduced to promote equality must be objectively and
reasonably justified and limited in time, and that measures seeking
to promote secularism must be strictly necessary. 68

The problem, of course, is multifarious in its essence. Protection
of the state’s secular identity jeopardizes society’s individual
freedoms and customs. The issue here is that if we agree that wearing
religious symbols violates public morals and public order, which
could be legitimate in particular cultural settings, are we admitting in
that case that some human rights are neutralized? If so, which rights?
Additionally, there is the question of gender equality. There are
multiple ways to frame this issue. Some would argue that wearing a
scarf would mean putting the woman into a position where her

68.

Id. ¶ 105.
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rights are endangered. But others would argue that the human rights
of women are violated by not allowing them to wear what they want.
In either case, the European Grand Chamber departed from the
previous opinions in Dahlab 69 and Sahin 70—cases where it stated that
wearing the scarf is contrary to the principles of tolerance and gender
equality. The court clearly separated the issue into two questions:
one was a question of the protection of public order and the other
was a question of having the right to a private life 71 and cultural
identity. 72 The problem was also shaped by the idea that secularism
should impose a particular form of state neutrality—understood to
mean that a state should remain neutral, but not require the same
from its citizens. 73 This is indicated when states tend to make peace
69. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22643. This was a Swiss case
deciding that a Muslim teacher could not wear a traditional Islamic headscarf while
teaching. Id.
70. Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 4474/98, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 299. This is a
Turkish case forbidding a student in a public medical school from wearing a headscarf. The
case was decided in favor of Turkish law. Id.
71. This expectation is protected by Article 8 of the Convention. There were also
applicants’ petitions regarding the alleged violation of the right to private and family life.
Article 8 states that (1) “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence,” and (2) “There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Convention, supra note 32,
at art. 8.
72. See Lasia Bloss, European Law of Religion: Organizational and Institutional
Analysis of National Systems and their Implications for the Future European Integration Process
(N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper 13/03, 2003). “The protection
of human dignity is similarly rejected as a legitimate aim by the Court. The Court states that it
‘is aware that the clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of those who observe it.
It would point out, however, that it is the expression of a cultural identity which contributes to
the pluralism that is inherent in democracy.’ The Court thus respects the applicant’s autonomy
and refrains from attributing a meaning to the way she is dressed and the religion she
professes. At the same time, the Court also clearly gives a message that the society cannot
impose its view on a particular religious dress on the women concerned.” Saïla Ouald Chaib &
Lourdes Peroni, S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing a
Face Veil, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS, Jul. 3, 2014, http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/
07/03/s-a-s-v-france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-wearing-a-face-veil/.
73. See generally Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and
Meaning, 2011 BYU L. REV. 657; Jay Wexler, Government Disapproval of Religion, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 119.
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between human rights and freedoms of the individual on one side
and state order in general on the other side.
2. The context
The history of the French approach is delicate and lengthy. 74
Most recently, France established the principle of secularism
(laïcité) 75 within its own Constitution of 1958: “France shall be an
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure
the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.” 76
There are two major problems with the implementation of this
secularist notion of equality. First, religion is not a significant issue in
French legal thinking; this is more pertinent for citizens with
religious beliefs, but also applies to those without them. Under basic
French law, religion is not something with which the French
Republic is really concerned. Religion is included merely because of
historical problems with the Catholic Church, which was
“dethroned” by the French revolution and its outcomes. Recent
developments in France show that religious and non-religious people
in France are not treated equally. In fact, atheists enjoy more
privilege since they are not required to wear scarfs or yamacas as part
of their religious practice. Another issue is connected with the
normative ideal that all religions are to be respected. From one point
of view, none are respected and followed in their literal forms.
The following situation illustrates the difficulty in treating
religions differently from other movements that could become a
public problem. Imagine if there was an artistic movement that
wanted only brown to be worn in public on Wednesdays. But, one
might say, artistic appearances are not covered by the ban. However,
what if the artistic movement became so powerful and pervasive as to

74. For purposes of this Article, I will focus on the recent history, although not without
some hesitation. The post-18th century revolution period had a significant influence on the
logic that shapes French governance even today in its more contemporary form.
75. See ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 46−64 (2007).
76. 1958 CONST. pmbl. art. 1 (France); see Bloss, supra note 72, at 21.

701

SAVIĆ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2016 12:12 PM

2015

penetrate every public place in the Nation. Who will decide and what
will determine and clarify when and if that artistic movement
becomes a cult (which might be more dangerous to society than
religion)? What would impact and influence the decision of which
artistic movements are to be treated as a religion and which remain
just art? 77
Although no one can legitimately declare that France is not a
country dedicated to human rights principles, the problem
nevertheless exists that France does not treat religions equally. This is
indicated by its tax regulations. 78 Bloss points out that even France is
not territorially homogenous in respect to equally approaching
religion: departments of the Alsace and Mossele regions as well as
the French Guyana have historically had special relationships with the
Catholic Church, which form constituent parts of the French state. 79
The so-called Eastern Departments in Alsace and Moselle (HautRhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle) maintain special relationships with the
Holy See for historical reasons. 80
Regarding treatment of Muslim clothing, the Republic has not
had a consistent approach. When in 1989, a local school in Grenoble
denied entry to a Muslim girl wearing a foulard to class, no one

77. Brian Leiter, professor of legal philosophy from the University of Chicago, proposes
two hypotheticals, one of which is real and the other fictional. In 2006, in front of the
Canadian Supreme Court Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.R. 6
(Can.) was argued, which resulted in a decision to allow a Sikh boy wearing a ritual knife
kirpan to go to public school since it represents his religious identity which would be
suppressed without such an item . On the other hand, Leiter argues that if a similar situation
arose and another boy requested the same right of wearing a gun into the classroom for
reasons which are not religious, but could be cultural and connected with his identity (like
passing the gun from grandfather to father to son), he correctly admits that courts’ decisions
would be entirely different. He asks all of us: Why do we tolerate religion? LEITER, supra note
19, at 1–4.
78. Bloss, supra note 72, at 23 (“The Government currently does not, for instance,
recognize Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Church of Scientology as fulfilling the requirements for a
religious association, and therefore subjects them to a 60% tax on all funds they receive.”).
Someone might say in jest that religion only matters in financial issues.
79. Id.
80. DOE, supra note 7, at 8 n.53 (According to the Law of Separation in 1905,
“diplomatic relations with the Holy See were cut in 1904; the law does not apply to HautRhin, Bas-Rhin, or Moselle, which were formerly under German Rule but returned to France
in 1918”).
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would have thought that it would cause decades of cultural fighting
on all levels in European judicial systems—in 1995, “[t]he Council
d’Etat . . . affirmed that simply wearing a headscarf does not provide
grounds for exclusion from school and subsequently struck down
some decisions to expel girls for wearing their foulards.” 81
Interestingly, only Belgium has adopted a similar law to the one
in France. 82
3. The court’s holdings
France’s actions are, to some extent, inconsistent. Even though
France is a secular state, it is still historically bound to its JudeoChristian traditions. The French society did not have problems with
the display of crosses and kippas (yamacas), which are a reflection of
its Judeo-Christian roots, but did have problems with the expressions
of the Muslim worshippers. As a result, France decided that showing
religious symbols in French public schools is contrary to the secular
foundations of the French state. Manifestations of religion matter
and are a major reason why France decided to ban burqas and hijabs,
a decision upheld by the European Court under its margin of
appreciation principle. “[T]he Council of Europe prefers States to
have a secular posture, with neutrality and separation between State
and religion, but at the same time promoting dialogue with religion.
However, the European Union formally respects the national

81. Bloss, supra note 72, at 27 (citation omitted).
82. Belgian Law was cited in S.A.S. v. France: “To date, only Belgium has passed a law
that is comparable to the French Law of 11 October 2010, and the Belgian Constitutional
Court has found it compatible with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion . . . . However, the question of a ban on concealing one’s face in public has been or is
being discussed in a number of other European States. A blanket ban remains a possibility in
some of them. In particular, a Bill has been tabled to that end in Italy: although it has not yet
passed into law, it appears that the discussion is still open. In Switzerland the Federal Assembly
rejected, in September 2012, an initiative of the Canton of Aargau seeking to ban the wearing
in public of clothing covering all or a large part of the face, but in Ticino there was a vote on
23 September 2013 for a ban of that kind (the text still has to be validated, however, by the
Federal Assembly). Such an option is also being discussed in the Netherlands, notwithstanding
unfavourable opinions by the Council of State . . . . It should also be noted that the Spanish
Supreme Court has ruled on the legality of a ban of that kind.” App. No. 43835/11, 2014
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 40 (internal citations omitted).
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church-state postures of its Member States.” 83 This attitude leaves a
wide space for implementing a quaestio facti approach and workable
margin of appreciation maneuvers.
The court in Strasbourg had concerns about how Islam could fit
within the framework of pluralism and democracy. 84 The Council of
Europe recognized that “Islam is not only a religion but also a social,
legal and political code of conduct,” and that “Islamism can be
violent or mainstream and peaceful, but in both cases it does not
accept the separation between religion and state, which is a
fundamental principle of democratic and pluralistic societies.” 85 It is
important to stress, as the Council did, that Islam is and should be
recognized as a religion that impacts and contributes to the
development of European culture and values. 86 Therefore, every
effort needs to be made to neutralize negative assumptions toward
people who profess that faith. 87 As in other religions, there are also
variations among different denominations, which should be
understood in their essential and social context. In his lecture at
Notre Dame University, Azouz Begag, former Minister for Equal
Opportunity of French Government, described problems which
Maghrebian youth face in France, living in “two worlds,” one of
ethnic and religious expectations and the other of the state formation
where they live. 88
This understanding clarifies why issues of secularism and nonreligious society were even more important in the French republic in
the S.A.S. case. Apart from being a “member” of a predominantly
Christian circle and having bonds with traditional Judeo-Christian

83. DOE, supra note 7, at 29, 29–30 nn.168–172 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 28. See Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 at 39
(Grand Chamber 2003).
85. Eur. Consult. Ass., Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, Res. 1743 ¶ 2
(2010), available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?
FileID=17880&lang=en.
86. Id.
87. See Palomino, supra note 73, at 658–59.
88. Azouz Begag, former Minister for Equal Opportunity of French Government,
Identity and Self-Construction Among the Children of Maghrebian Immigrants in France,
Keynote Address at the University of Notre Dame: The Place of Islam in Contemporary European
Literature, in NANOVIC INSTITUTE LECTURE SERIES, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME,
LECTURE PAPER 15 (Nov. 16–18, 2009), available at https://nanovic.nd.edu/assets/60893/
paper_15_final_web.pdf.
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values with a secular prefix, France is actually protecting what is an
essential part of its existence: a secular environment. The secular
environment is a state’s public morals, which determines what the
public order is or which shape it should take. Public morals and
public order are again key determining factors of the creed of society
as a whole.
One must ask if it is possible to achieve a softer approach in
using the margin of appreciation doctrine and reaching the standards
that could amalgamate both desires: to have a country that values
and recognizes human rights and to have a country of predominant
values. Contemporary Europe has not been able to depart from its
evolutional path in which human rights were delivered, but which
also lean on tradition and culture through the same evolution. 89
Acknowledging and valuing both create a formula for peaceful
coexistence. Fear cannot be the reason to give up human rights and
standards of freedoms.
Other issues put before the Court in the S.A.S. case could also
have an impact on religious freedom. One issue raised was a question
regarding gender equality, which was argued in connection with the
violation of religious freedom. Gender issues were used to unwrap
religious discrimination and to purport that this was a case in which
women should stand together to protect women’s rights. 90 The
Court dismissed those arguments 91 and explained that there was not
enough evidence to prove that religious scarfs put women in a
subordinate position and that it should remain a question of culture,
which in this case was a private matter. 92
The Court paid more attention to the issue of cultural identity,
which in a democratic society should be observed through the lens
of democratic principles: if we accept that people may have different
89. See Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1.1–1.2, 1.4
(Bonello, J., concurring).
90. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17.
91. Id. ¶¶ 118–19.
92. Id. ¶ 119 (“The Court takes the view, however, that a State Party cannot invoke
gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women—such as the applicant—
in the context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be
understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own
fundamental rights and freedoms.”). See also Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, App. No.
14518/89, 1993 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 67; Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], App. No.
30078/06, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 127 (2012).
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reasons to belong to particular religious groups, and we (at least)
tolerate that, we should tolerate beliefs which belong to the different
cultural models which form those religions. 93 It is not possible to
respect pure belonging without recognizing that the belonging is
established on different sets of values and world views, which if they
weren’t different would be our own. While human dignity was
worthy of discussion, the Court made no findings that a woman
wearing religious clothing by her own choice was enough to find
discrimination—it would be hard in any modern legal system to
describe the willful behavior of a mature person as discrimination. 94
The Grand Chamber argued deeply about the coexistence of
religions in democratic societies. Sometimes, they said, such
coexistence will necessitate setting some rules, (in accordance with
the majority’s culture) which will enable all to feel comfortable, or at
least less uncomfortable. 95 Also, the Court discussed the states’
duties of neutrality and impartiality: “Pluralism and democracy must
also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise necessarily
entailing various concessions on the part of individuals or groups of
individuals which are justified in order to maintain and promote the
ideals and values of a democratic society.” 96
93. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (“States have
responsibility for ensuring, neutrally and impartially, the exercise of various religions, faiths and
beliefs. Their role is to help maintain public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a
democratic society, particularly between opposing groups . . . .”).
94. S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 119–20 (“[H]owever essential
it may be, respect for human dignity cannot legitimately justify a blanket ban on the wearing of
the full-face veil in public places. The Court is aware that the clothing in question is perceived
as strange by many of those who observe it. It would point out, however, that it is the
expression of a cultural identity that contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in democracy.
It notes in this connection the variability of the notions of virtuousness and decency that are
applied to the uncovering of the human body. Moreover, it does not have any evidence capable
of leading it to consider that women who wear the full-face veil seek to express a form of
contempt against those they encounter or otherwise to offend against the dignity of others.”).
95. Id. ¶ 126. (“In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one
and the same population, it may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to manifest one’s
religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that
everyone’s beliefs are respected.”).
96. Id. ¶ 127–28 (“[The Court] also considers that the State’s duty of neutrality and
impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of
religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed . . . .”). See also Manoussakis v.
Greece, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1363, ¶ 47 (1996); Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC],
App. No. 30985/96, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 78; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey
[GC], App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶
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Regarding Article 9 of the Convention that protects free practice
of religious beliefs (including the ability to believe, to show, and to
proselytize), 97 the Court in S.A.S., and through manifestation
decided to use “a wide margin of appreciation” 98 doctrine, as it
opined that French society is so immersed in the principle of
secularism. 99 In other words, secularism is the core value of French
society and it is connected with all common values of “living
together” within the limits of the same society. 100 Furthermore, the
Court described the limitation on the freedom of religion in this case
as “necessary,” and did not say that under some other circumstances
and in some other cultural landscape, it would not
decide differently. 101
A valuable part of the Court’s decision is when it decided to
expressly state that national traditions are to be respected and
regarded as important while at the same time defending the margin
of appreciation approach, which many consider too broadly
accepted, used, explained, and tolerated. 102 The major problem in
following the French approach is, as stated before, the nontransparent behavior of the French Republic in which it is difficult to

91. “[T]his duty requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups.”
S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 127.
97. See DOE, supra note 7, at 40, 44–49.
98. S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 155.
99. Id. ¶¶ 153–58.
100. Id.
101. Id. ¶ 129 (“As regards Article 9 of the Convention, the State should thus, in
principle, be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extent a
limitation of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs is ‘necessary’. That being said, in
delimiting the extent of the margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extend a
limitation of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs is ‘necessary.’”); see, e.g.,
Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 44; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 4474/98, 2004
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 110. “[The Court] may also, if appropriate, have regard to any consensus and
common values emerging from the practices of the States parties to the Convention (see, for
example, Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, § 122, ECHR 2011).” Id.
102. Id. ¶ 130. (“[I]t was thus not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform
conception of the significance of religion in society and that the meaning or impact of the
public expression of a religious belief would differ according to time and context. It observed
that the rules in this sphere would consequently vary from one country to another according
to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and
freedoms of others and to maintain public order. It concluded from this that the choice of the
extent and form of such rules must inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it
would depend on the specific domestic context.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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know what the rules are. By recognizing traditional, cultural, and
even religious foundations of the French republic, a state could be
fair and say that traditions (even those hidden in secularism) are to
be respected (Awareness and Foundations Principles) and care would
be then given to maximize protections of minorities who a deserve
fair approach (Human Right Principle). Saying that the French
Republic is secular and respecting of religious beliefs, while at the
same time restricting those rights dramatically, results in
unnecessary confusion.
Another objection is that French secularism has characteristics of
religion, but prefers and tolerates the more traditional cultural
elements rooted in French history and folklore. As previously stated,
acting like this la Republique, to some extent, is unfair to the Muslim
community. 103 The principle of proportionality is evidenced as
“[c]ourts throughout Europe often engage in a determination of
whether a restriction of the right to manifest religion is justified on
grounds of necessity.” 104 This principle is mentioned as an integral
part of the process of acquiring the label of margin of appreciation.
The margin of appreciation can’t be fully understood without the
principle of proportionality. 105
In conjunction with that principle, the Court ruled that the
S.A.S. case was different from previous cases of a similar sort since
this ban was considered as pertaining to Muslim women wearing the
kind of clothing that covers most of the face and hides most of the
body. 106 This was deemed justifiable as a necessity in order to
promote and maintain public safety. 107 Public safety is viewed as an
integral part of European society. The Court considered whether the
ban was “necessary in a democratic society for public safety”—also

103. See supra text accompanying note 66.
104. DOE, supra note 7, at 62.
105. Id.
106. See S.A.S., App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 136 (“Among all these cases
concerning Article 9, Ahmet Arslan and Others is that which the present case most closely
resembles. However, while both cases concern a ban on wearing clothing with a religious
connotation in public places, the present case differs significantly from Ahmet Arslan and
Others in the fact that the full-face Islamic veil has the particularity of entirely concealing the
face, with the possible exception of the eyes.”).
107. Id. ¶ 138.
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confirming that the court was dedicated to “protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.” 108
The Court observes that this is an aim to which the authorities
have given much weight. This can be seen, in particular, from the
explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill, which indicates
that “[t]he voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is
problematic because it is quite simply incompatible with the
fundamental requirements of ‘living together’ in French society”
and that “[t]he systematic concealment of the face in public places,
contrary to the ideal of fraternity, . . . falls short of the minimum
requirement of civility that is necessary for social interaction” . . . .
It indeed falls within the powers of the State to secure the
conditions whereby individuals can live together in their diversity.
Moreover, the Court is able to accept that a State may find it
essential to give particular weight in this connection to the
interaction between individuals and may consider this to be
adversely affected by the fact that some conceal their faces in
public places. 109

The Court equates the fundamental requirement of “living
together” with the principle of secularity and the public morals of
the French Republic. The Grand Chamber “reiterates that remarks
which constitute a general, vehement attack on religious or ethnic
groups are incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace
and non-discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not
fall within the right to freedom of expression that it protects.” 110 The
Court in S.A.S. decided that the kinds of decisions like the banning
of full-face veils, is not against the “choice of society,” 111 and is
against the cultural necessity of the appearance of the veil in public.
Cultural norms ground the choice of society in ways that are similar
to choices that are religious in their nature and consistent with that
society’s chosen values.
Thus, the question of whether women should be permitted to
wear the full-face veil in public places constitutes a choice of society.
This case is actually about giving the margin of appreciation to
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 141 (emphasis added).
110. Id. ¶ 149 (citations omitted).
111. Id. ¶ 153. Choice of society means the shape of public morals and the shape of
public order, which is formalized trough democratic representation of the majority of citizens.
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France on the grounds of the cultural shape of the French republic.
Limitations, which were impugned, are to be considered a necessity
in a democratic state like France. 112 To be sure, a democratic state,
which also belongs to a particular cultural and religious circle, is
covered by the veil of secularism.
4. A Dutch comparison
A comparison with the Netherlands shows a better solution to
France’s problem. The Netherlands, in many respects, is comparable
to France. Both countries are members of the European Union and
the Council of Europe, and are firmly situated with the secular
character of the state. They also share (to some extent) a similar
European history and, in many cases, similar values. Contrary to the
French cases, Dutch regulations banning religious clothing were
struck down by the Council of State of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, where the ruling authority of the State was not ready to
move away from the principles of individual freedoms. 113 France and
the Netherlands belong to the same spectrum of countries where the
state is “neutral” toward both religion and religious communities
and where the financial support of the State is excluded. 114 But, we

112. Id. ¶ 158.
113. Id. ¶¶ 51−52. In this case, the Court found that “the Government had not stated
how the wearing of clothing covering the face was fundamentally incompatible with the ‘social
order’ (maatschappelijke orde), nor had they demonstrated the existence of a pressing social
need (dringende maatschappelijke behoefte) justifying a blanket ban, or indicated why the
existing regulations enabling specific prohibitions hitherto deemed appropriate were no longer
sufficient, or explained why the wearing of such clothing, which might be based on religious
grounds, had to be dealt with under criminal law. . . .Lastly, the Council of State found that
the subjective feeling of insecurity could not justify a blanket ban on the basis of social order or
public order (de maatschappelijke of de openbare orde). . . . The Council of State further
indicated that, in view of the foregoing, the Bill was not compatible with the right to freedom
of religion. In its view, a general ban on wearing clothing that covered the face did not meet a
pressing social need and was not therefore necessary in a democratic society.” Id. These
arguments are of course expected to arrive from the Dutch state, a country strongly dedicated
to the principles of free religion and individual rights. It could be said that the Netherlands
developed a completely different model of secularity in which individual religiosity is to be
protected at almost all costs. So religion can enter public space as long as it enters through the
individual and not through the State. However, recent developments in security issues could
possibly change the mindset of the Dutch people.
114. DOE, supra note 7, at 29.
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also witness different approaches to particular religious issues in each
one of these states. As Norman Doe states, in France, “the doctrine
of laïcité positive” allows for religious liberty, while at the same time,
“perhaps paradoxically, . . . generates cooperation between State and
religion.” 115 As a result, “religious groups may function as private law
associations; assistance is given to the maintenance of historic places
of worship; and funding is available for spiritual assistance in schools,
hospitals, prisons, and the armed forces; moreover, the president is
consulted about the appointment of Catholic bishops.” 116 This also
shows that traditional elements of belonging are not formalistically
present in the modern French state. Another anomaly is found in the
spiritual leadership and support in the French army. There are
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish personnel, but not Islamic or
Hindu, for instance. 117
The differences between the French and Dutch treatments of
religions are also seen in their different treatment of the people’s
right to manifest their religion. It is commonly accepted that
religious rights of individuals include: a) the right to believe and b)
the right to manifest. Since the right to believe is uncontrollable, 118
only the right to manifest belief falls under the scope of law. The
right to manifest is visible to the public and, therefore, enters the
public sphere where a person might interact with others and the

115. Id. at 34.
116. Id. (citations omitted). This seems contrary to the idea that France is not funding
religion. However, the services funded are considered social activities and religious groups are
considered charities. See Bloss, supra note 72, at 24–25 (noting that there are also actions
which are more pragmatic and political than coherent). It is obvious that France has a special
interest in cooperating with religious communities of some significance for two reasons: one
societal and financial (using church infrastructure, personnel etc.) and the other purely political
(France does not forget that the majority of its citizens is still Catholic). So there is no financial
support for religion, but there is financial support for religious services. See DOE, supra note 7,
at 34 nn.217–18 (pointing at the Napoleonic Concordat with the Holy See (July 15, 1801),
which remained unchanged in this section).
117. Bloss, supra note 72, at 27 n.61.
118. Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur (lat.) [No one suffers punishment for mere
intent.]. The phrase comes from the principles of Roman law and from general principles of
criminal law. Even if thoughts would have been punished one must report himself in order to
be prosecuted. See Gordana Buzarovska-Lazetic, Olga Kosevaliska & Lazar Nanev, The
“Extension” of the Roman Criminal Law in Today’s Macedonian Criminal Laws, 6
MEDITERRANEAN J. OF SOC. SCIS. 318, 319 n.2 (2015).
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practices of others and society as a whole. Doe correctly notes the
importance of religion as seen in ECtHR writings where it is defined
and emphasized. 119
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the
foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists,
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism
indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won
over the centuries, depends on it. 120

Both French and Dutch models belong among those that favor
separation of church and state, but the two countries extend the
definition of ‘the right to manifest’ principle differently, which is
then applied to the public space. The ‘right to manifest’ is much
more appreciated in the Netherlands and almost made equal to the
‘right to believe.’ It is important to distinguish between religious
freedom and religious tolerance. 121 Religious freedom in France is
determined with a lower level of religious tolerance than in the
Netherlands. The reasons for that are, of course, historical and
therefore cultural. It is interesting though, that France, as a secular
country, still adheres to its Judeo-Christian roots as is obvious in the
case S.A.S. v. France. 122 Non-religious France still maintains its ties
through manifestations of cultural Christianity and, in some less-

119. DOE, supra note 7, at 29.
120. Id. at 43 (quoting Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep.
397, 409 (1993)).
121. See DOE, supra note 7, at 44 (“[R]eligious freedom is not to be confused with
religious tolerance.”); see also CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA, art. 29 (“(1) Freedom of
thought, opinion, and religious beliefs shall not be restricted in any form whatsoever. No one
shall be compelled to embrace an opinion or religion contrary to his own convictions. (2)
Freedom of conscience is guaranteed; it must be manifested in a spirit of tolerance and
mutual respect.”).
122. S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 80, 133–35 (noting
that the treatment of other religious symbols was not a problem to the French Republic on
that scale).
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important but symbolically significant aspects, through formal
connections with Catholicism. 123
In examining both French and Dutch perspectives, there is a
balancing between majorities’ and minorities’ requests and desires
(Cohabitation Principle). It is understandable that for cultural and
functional reasons, a state has specific décor and appearance requests
for its citizens. In relation to the veil, France and the Netherlands
have said that the veil should be allowed to be worn, but there are
specific justified situations where all members of the community
should respect the functional needs of the country and also respect
the culture(s) of the majority (Democratic Principle). Having human
rights without respect for democratic principles annuls the first
principle of individual rights, which requests that the source that
provides the rights is respected. If the source which “gives human
rights” is not respected, it would be insincere to request rights
within the system which one feels is flawed. 124 In more concrete
terms, it would mean that while a state would generally allow
wearing veils in public, the state may request that the veil be
removed at police controls, at borders, while taking photos for
official documents, while taking exams, at court witnessing, and
other such occasions. It would mean requesting removal for practical
(functional) reasons, which are of course connected with the
practicalities of the state. Balancing the rights of both the majority
and the minority is key, as demonstrated in the final example of
Croatia, where constitutional changes still left enough space for the
protection of the rights of non-believers who wanted a proposed
amendment that marriage should only be reserved for
heterosexual couples.

123. See supra note 7; infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. The portions comment
on Alsace and Lorraine (Moselle) and the specific positions of clergy in charity or state
work (military).
124. Quod ab initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere (lat.) (What is
wrong or flawed from the beginning cannot transform with passage of time).
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C. Marriage is Between a Man and a Woman: The Story of the
Recent Constitutional Change in Croatia 125
The story of Croatia’s constitutional marriage amendment shows
how public morals of the majority can be preserved without
trampling on the rights of the minority. This section begins by laying
out this story. It then addresses the arguments on both sides, as well
as the problems that arise from a situation like this. It finishes with
possible solutions, including the one that Croatia chose.
1. History of the amendment
The Croatian Constitution can be changed in two ways. One is
by establishing a regular procedure conducted in Parliament in
which two thirds of all representatives will have to vote in favor of
the change. 126 Another mode, which until now has never been used,
is a constitutional change made by the people themselves in an
indirect way—by referendum. 127 Croatian regulations require that
10% of the voting body sign formal request for referendum in which
50% of people who vote must be in favor of the decision proposed. 128
This relatively low percentage of votes for changing the quite firm
Constitution is a result of a recent constitutional change which
happened just before Croatia joined the EU: the ruling party and
opposition agreed that it would be too risky to jeopardize entering
the EU after all those painful years of negotiations. 129 This
constitutional change opened the door more widely to citizens’
initiatives allowing people to be more involved through activism
and influence.
125. The text of this section, which has been changed and amended, was initially
prepared for discussion at the Conference ‘Religion, Democracy and Law’ held at London
Metropolitan University (UK) in January 2014.
126. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, Dec. 22, 1990 (consolidated text)
Jul. 6, 2001, art. 147 (Croat.). Constitution of the Republic of Croatia CROATIA CONST.,
and Referendum Law: Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia No. 33/1996, 92/2001,
44/2006, 58/2006, 69/2007, 38/2009.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Tea Romić & Tomislav Krasnec, Analiza kako je glasovala Hrvatska – protiv EU
bilo 18 općina, VEČERNJI LIST, Jan. 23, 2012 [analysis on how Croatia decided on referendum
for joining EU], http://www.vecernji.hr/eu/analiza-kako-je-glasovala-hrvatska-protiv-eubilo-18-opcina-368801.

714

SAVIĆ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

679

2/10/2016 12:12 PM

Still Fighting God in the Public Arena

Until recently, there had not been any successful collection of
enough votes in order to make a change. However, just before the
summer of 2013 the Croatian public was faced with a large public
initiative started by a relatively small and until then unknown NonGovernmental Organization (NGO), “In the Name of the Family.” 130
Nearly 750,000 signatures were collected in just two weeks, 131 more
than was required by Croatian referendum laws. This sparked the
largest public debate in the nation since the days of independence.
Although Croatian Family Law defines marriage as a union
between a man and a woman, the citizens’ initiative insisted that this
should be a part of the Constitution. 132 The reasoning was that
marriage is one of the highest moral values of Croatian society and
therefore should be written into the Constitution as a safeguard
ensuring that this could not be changed by a political decision of any
ruling party in the future. 133 As leaders of the initiative said, what
happened in France with legalization of gay marriages and allowing
same-sex couples to adopt hastened the decision to organize action
in support of the traditional family. 134 Croatia is predominantly a
Catholic country, 135 and as a result the majority of its citizens feel
that marriage should be protected as the union of a man and a
woman, and as a place where the State should intervene to protect

130. See O nama [About Us], U IME OBITELJI [IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY] (last
updated Jan. 2, 2014), http://referendumobraku.uimeobitelji.net/o_nama/.
131. See The first referendum initiated by citizens at 1st December 2013, U IME OBITELJI
[IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY] (Nov. 19, 2013), http://referendumobraku.uimeobitelji.net/
2013/11/19/first-referendum-initiated-citizens-1st-december-2013/.
132. Article 12 of the Family Law, Brak je zakonom uređena zajednica žene i muškarca
[Marriage is the union of men and woman regulated by law.], National Gazette of the
Republic of Croatia No. 103/2015. For a similar example of this situation in Australia, see
Neville Rochow, Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace - The Influence of Constitutional
Argument on Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Debates in Australia, 2013 BYU L. REV. 521.
133. See Ivan Miklenić, Hrvatska i dalje većinski katolička zemlja [Croatia still predominantly
a Catholic country], GLASA KONCILA [VOICE OF THE COUNCIL], Jun. 1, 2013, http://www.glaskoncila.hr/index.php?option=com_php&Itemid=41&news_ID=21748.
134. See id.
135. Out of 4,284,889 citizens, 3,697,143 declared themselves as Catholic. See Census of
Population, Households and Dwellings 2011, Population by Citizenship, Ethnicity, Religion and
Mother Tongue, REPUBLIC OF CROATIA BUREAU OF STATISTICS, available at
http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2012/SI-1469.pdf; see also Ivan Miklenić,
Hrvatska i dalje većinski katolička zemlja [Croatia still predominantly a Catholic country],
GLASA KONCILA [VOICE OF THE COUNCIL], Jun. 1, 2013, http://www.glas-koncila.hr/
index.php?option=com_php&Itemid=41&news_ID=21748.
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procreation, which is in the interest of every modern state (at least
economically, if not existentially).
The initiative had a great deal of support. Specifically, it had the
support of most of the major religious groups in the country
including the Catholic Church, the Islamic Community, and the
Orthodox Church. 136 The Jewish Community was divided in two by
suggesting to its believers that they should follow their conscience.
Pro-gay activists argued that this initiative would harm the human
rights of people of different sexual orientation and felt that Croatia
would be going backward if this change were to take effect. 137 The
proponents for the initiative argued that they were not against gay
rights, and that those rights, including unions, should be regulated
by law. 138 But they argued that those unions could not be called
marriage and that child adoption should only be reserved for
heterosexual couples. 139 The legal issue here is that the initiative felt
that by allowing gay couples to enter into marriages and adopt
children, the State would break from public morals, which is the
legal standard from which all norms of the society derive (from civil
to criminal to medical laws, etc.). In the eastern parts of the EU,
these public morals shape moral and furthermore legal standards, for
instance, in countries such as Poland or Hungary. 140
But the initiative also faced significant opposition. It was
confronted by same-sex activist groups and various NGOs from the
liberal spectrum. These groups argued that issues regarding same-sex
marriage and adoption should not be regulated by the Constitution,

136. See Podupiremo referendum za brak jer time želimo zaštiti najslabije u našem društvu
[We support referendum for marriage because we want to protect the weakest in our society],
HRVATSKA BISKUPSKA KONFERENCIJA [CROATIAN BISHOPRIC CONFERENCE], Nov. 12, 2013,
http://www.hbk.hr/?type=vijest&ID=465.
137. Croatians Back Same-Sex Marriage Ban in Referendum, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25172778.
138. See Miklenić, supra note 133.
139. See id.
140. “The marriage as the union of men and woman equally as family, motherhood and
fatherhood will be under protection.” THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
Apr. 2, 1997, ch. 1, art. 18, available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/
kon1.htm. The “State of Hungary will protect institution of marriage as union of man and
woman which is stipulated by free decision and institution of family which is stone base of
nation existence.” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, art. L, available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf.
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since those are in the sphere of human rights. 141 However, the
ECtHR decided that right to marriage is not a human right and that
family law is one of those branches of laws that the European
Union’s legislation doesn’t cover because of cultural differences
between the states. 142 Although same-sex couples do have rights in
terms of free movement of people and labor laws. 143 The Croatian
Government, which is currently left oriented (social democrats), had
its hands tied, although there were still attempts made to stop
the referendum.
In November 2013, the Croatian Parliament approved a
referendum that would determine whether the definition of marriage
as the union of a woman and a man should become part of the
country’s constitution. 144 Although the majority of MPs 145 were
against the idea (left wing parties), they could do little to prevent the
parliament from allowing it to happen. This was amalgamated with
the current wish to change the rules of the referendum in order to
prevent similar referendums in the future. 146 The rules which were
good enough when required for entering the EU were not popular
with the ruling party now that they opposed the idea in question
(reserving marriage strictly for heterosexual couples).
An unprecedented and difficult public debate, which caused
unimaginable division in Croatian society was followed by activism

141. See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Gas and
Dubois v. France, App. No. 25951/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.
142. Id.; see also The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17 (2000).pdf
(last visited Sept. 4, 2015); Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
143. See
also
The
Margin
of
Appreciation,
COUNCIL
OF
EUR.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17 (2000).pdf
(last visited Sept. 4, 2015). See also Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
144. Sabor odlučio: Na referendum o definiciji braka idemo 1. prosinca! [Parliament
decided: The referendum on the definition of marriage go on December 1!], NOVA TV (Nov. 8,
2013, 12:36), http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/u-saboru-danas-glasovanje-o-referendumuo-braku---310315.html.
145. MP refers to a member of the Croatian parliament.
146. Građanske inicijative i pravni stručnjaci: Vlada želi novim zakonom spriječiti
građanske referendume! [Civic Initiatives and legal experts: the government wants the new law to
prevent civil referendums!], NAROD.HR [PEOPLE], Feb. 17, 2015, http://narod.hr/
hrvatska/podolnjak-ovaj-prijedlog-zakona-je-uveden-s-jednom-namjerom-da-sprijeci-buducegradanske-inicijative.
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on both sides (pro et contra). 147 This kind of intensive and everpresent activism involving hundreds of volunteers and such great
media coverage as had not been seen before. No issue had ever been
so inflammatory in Croatian public space. On December 1, 2013,
when 37% of all those with voting rights came out to vote, the
majority of citizens (65%) voted for the formulation “Marriage is the
union between a man and a woman,” while 33% voted against. 148
This norm became Article 62 paragraph 2 of the Croatian
Constitution. 149 With the strong support of many churches, 150
Croatia 151 decided to join Bulgaria 152, Hungary 153, Latvia 154,
Lithuania 155 and Poland 156 as one of the European Union countries
which maintain a traditional definition of marriage protected by its
Constitution. But, this Amendment had major arguments on both
sides and was not without its challenges.
2. Arguments and challenges
One reason for rejecting marriages and child adoption for samesex couples is the defense of public morals. This is rooted in Natural

147. See Croatians Back Same-Sex Marriage Ban in Referendum, supra note 137.
148. Id.
149. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, Dec. 22, 1990 and later
amendments CROATIA CONST., ch. 3, pt. 3, art. 62 (“(1) The family shall enjoy the special
protection of the state. (2) Marriage is the union between a man and a woman. (3) Marriage
and legal relationships in the marriage, common-law marriage, and family shall be regulated
by law.”).
150. Examples include the Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Islamic
Community, and the Jewish Community Beth-Israel.
151. At this time, Croatia was the newest member of the European Union and had just
been involved in a terrible war twenty years previous.
152. CONSTITUTION OF BULGARIA, Jul. 12, 1991, ch. 2, art. 46, available at
http://www.parliament.bg/en/const.
153. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, art. L, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/8204FB28-BF22-481A-9426-D2761D10EC7C/
0/FUNDAMENTALLAWOFHUNGARYmostrecentversion01102013.pdf.
154. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, Oct. 15, 1998, ch. 8, art. 110,
available at http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/constitution.
155. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, Oct. 25, 1992, ch. 3, art. 8,
available at http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm.
156. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, Apr. 2, 1997, ch. 1, art. 18,
available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm.
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Law which, in theory, is determined by nature. 157 Therefore, the
argument is that even if marriage itself may be a social phenomenon,
delivering babies is not, which is biological or natural in its essence.
For lawyers, legal theorists, and constitutional lawyers, there is always
the perpetual question of what the law should represent. Law could
be a reflection of the majority’s prevailing moral feelings on
particular questions and issues and, therefore, citizens should have
the right to live in a county which is shaped by their moral and/or
religious beliefs. Religion and religious issues are different than any
other social phenomena, partly for reasons that include questions of
ultimate reality and a desire to fulfill rules and duties that sometimes
require fighting for the frameworks (including the legal system) in
which followers want to live.
The difficulty comes from the tension between public morals and
the rights of minorities. A pluralistic society focused on human rights
requires that we accept the rights of minority groups who think
differently. By doing so, we are also accepting that all humans are
equal in their choices and decisions and that freedom is the greatest
of all goods (whether given by God or nature). But there are
particular questions relating to these choices which become more
public and communal and for which a need to demand social
interference and create regulation exists. Balancing between the
rights of the majority and the minority is the key task that will make
global pluralistic societies work. Allowing minority rights to be fully
lived should be in some sort of accord with the function of society as
a whole. By allowing the minority to live its beliefs and choice of
lifestyle at any time and all ways causes, as some harshly call it, a
“dictatorship of the minority.” 158 But this also must not be an excuse
to allow any repressive measures against minorities just because they
are different.

157. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law Theories, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-theories/.
158. This is terminus technicus (lat.) for all situations when you are forced to follow the
minority rule instead of the majority one, because you have no other option. This is seen when
a government decides according to the desires of minority party because the government had
to include the minority party in order to be able to form the government. The consequence of
this is that although the minority party does not have real power in quantity, in reality it could
rule on particular issues because if it decide to go out of the coalition, the
government collapses.
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There are various combinations of issues that arise in this area,
and many times the answers are not black and white. If, for instance,
the credo of the society is religious freedom, then that freedom will
of necessity in some cases be restricted by the principles of public
security or public morals; 159 and other times religious rights will
prevail as the strongest argument in the outcome of a particular
case. 160 Here, new concerns are raised when there are established
religions in states with regard to the rights of those who are not
members of the established religions. On the other hand, if
secularism (laïcité) is the basic credo of the society that exists parallel
to the religious freedom principle, like in France (although one
should doubt if something like exclusive secularism truly exists at
all), the rights of the minority groups should be protected, even if
there are restrictions of some sort. 161 This raises the questions of
which public values will be recognized and protected and which will
not and potentially even be suppressed?
Democracy has to retain its virtue by not smashing the small and
weak. In its essence it consists of the chance to decide and win and
also the possibility to be free, and to be different, and to act
differently. If we put this into a theological perspective, freedom is
essentially God’s gift. If God wants an individual to be free to choose
on his own, who has a right to prevent that ability to choose and
when? 162 Of course we should always consider the limits in terms in
which John Stuart Mill operated. 163 Balancing between acquiring
rights for the minority within the society that lives a different lifestyle
and maintaining respect for that different society of which one is also
a part is a test for the modern state and society in which we are living

159. See generally LEITER, supra note 19.
160. See generally Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.R.
6 (Can.).
161. See Loi 2001-504 du June 12, 2001 tendant à renforcer la prévention et la
répression des mouvements sectaires portant atteinte aux droits de l’homme et aux libertés
fondamentales [Law 2001-504 of June 12, 2001 11, 2010 to strengthen the prevention and
repression of sectarian movements affecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms]
available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000589924&
dateTexte=&categorieLien=id. This law is commonly known as the About-Picard law.
162. See JORGE M. BERGOGLIO & Rabbi ABRAHAM, SKORKA, SOBRE EL CIELO Y LA
TIERRA 56 (2012).
163. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 101 (4th ed. 1869) (“The liberty of the
individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.”).
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today. With all of these challenges, it would seem difficult to find a
solution, but there are some.
3. Solutions.
As mentioned earlier, proportionality principles should be
followed in an effort to balance (Cohabitation Principle) the rights
of the majority to live in an organized society that represents the
values of its culture (Awareness and Foundations Principles) and the
rights of the minority (Human Rights Principle), which have to be
extended to the ultimate line of possibility. For example, it would
not be right to ask from a state based on Sharia to allow selling
whiskey on the streets, but it would be reasonable in that state to ask
if Christians and Jews may use wine in the religious services they
perform. Furthermore, maybe it would not be right to ask to allow
same-sex adoption in a traditional Catholic society, but it would be
more than fair to allow equal property rights for same-sex couples.
To balance these tough legal dilemmas, a sensitive and tolerant
approach is needed on all sides.
Croatia chose to follow this proportionality principle (or
Cohabitation Principle). First, it is important to note that same-sex
couples already have or will have the same rights as married couples
with two distinctive characteristics: homosexual couples will call their
union a “registered partnership” and they will not have the right to
adopt children. Second, it is also important to stress again that EU
laws do not regulate in the area of family law as can be seen in the
case law of the ECtHR with the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine. 164
This doctrine shows respect for cultural differences of particular
European countries and allows them to regulate family
law accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
Aggressive secularism doesn’t have meaning in a territory that is
deeply rooted in history and tradition and is shaped by those
traditions, which constitute the system itself. The recent judgments
of the ECtHR and the socio-legal infrastructure of Europe and its
164. Hämäläinen v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145768.
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nations are based on balancing two standards: democracy (majority
principle) and human rights protection (minority principle). 165 This
balance should occur with the following tenets in mind:
1. Europe is not secular in its essence. When it seems that this is
the case, it is because of political decisions not arising from the
democratic needs of its citizens (majority principle).
2. Europe, as does every other political and legal space, has its
own legal culture and legal history that shapes it, and its legal culture
forms the public morals.
3. Before any position is determined by the majority or the
minority, and before searching or investigating the prevailing moral
and legal rules, states should recognize religion as a phenomena of
exclusive character, because for many it determines what life really
should be and touches upon questions of ultimate reality which are
necessary for a vast number of humans.
4. Contemporary Europe is founded on the idea of human rights
(minority principle) and dedicated to the promotion of and respect
for differences. At the same time, it is necessary to determine real
legal frameworks so that the majority does not feel that it lives in its
“own foreign country.”
5. Balancing between the rights of the minority and the rights of
the majority is necessary; even though it is difficult, it is the key task
for lawyers and politicians alike.
6. Making secularism the religion of the state leads to the
subordination of all members of society to the rules of that
“religion.” They then feel that they are in a passive position, as a
result of the State conquering all who cherish different cultures. That
approach could lead to requests which are against the legal order, the
public order, or public morals. 166
7. Real solutions come from understanding the traditions and
foundations upon which a particular community is founded (JudeoChristian, Islamic, Hindu, etc.), together with requests for the
protection of the public order with maximal possible protection of
165. Although human rights are to be attached, or are attached to every human person
from birth to death, in this statement I mean the protection of citizens who do not belong to
the mainstream group and feel weak and fragile in a democratic society which is governed by
the majority that sets the rules that guarantee freedoms, the same freedoms that the majority
already enjoys and that are shaped trough the institutions of the legal system.
166. Referring to autonomy and heteronomy in the law.
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human rights. These solutions are where the minimum requirements
of mutual understanding are met and where tolerance
becomes acceptance.
These principles seek to protect both human rights and religious
freedoms, although the latter possesses the pure essence of human
rights. Denying formative elements that constitute the system of
human rights in full can lead to serious and even tectonic disruptions
of the legal system, which is built upon those elements.
Amalgamation of human rights with public order and public morals
could lead to a solution that protects higher values together with
necessary values. Necessary values are those that are connected with
the life of the legal system itself and without which the legal system
would lose its distinctive element of existence. If religion has its
distinctive place in the society, or at least if religious beliefs
influenced the legal system in which it is rooted, all subjects should
respect it and find a way to maneuver within it, even when they
sometimes feel distant and that it is not their own.
Religion is not just a system of creeds; it is often part of the
nation’s values. By not recognizing this, states risk jumping into the
fight with the principles on which the state itself is built, unprepared
and with behavior that is contrary to the democratic principles of the
legal system itself. Protection of the broader community’s rights is
connected with protecting the public order, which is often discussed
in ECtHR arguments and decisions. 167 The right of the majority,
which can enforce its will in referendums through elections, and
through requests for law-making, should never be stymied by only
allowing individual human rights to prevail. But, since protection of
individual rights is essential to having a just and fair Europe,
democratic principles should always be adjusted to protect human
rights inasmuch as possible. Balance is the key.
Recognizing that religious and cultural values are actually
derived from the creeds of religious groups in these countries, sends

167. See The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.echr.coe.int/
LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17 (2000).pdf (last visited Sept. 4,
2015); see also Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499. The
European Court justified the limitation of freedom of expression over the protection of public
morals. See generally HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
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a clear and non-hypocritical message of accepting cultural and thus
religious norms for the sake of non-aggressive secularism. Secularity
in Europe without religion does not have a place in the political
landscape: a secular Europe which recognizes religion as an eminent
factor can flourish. Successfully balancing these ideals in Europe will
require everyone to respect the basic principles of cultural pluralism,
leaving a place for everyone in the culture which protects its own
fundamental cultural qualities.
Human rights are not and must not be an excuse for behavior
that damages others while producing selfish benefits. Therefore, it is
important to keep the moral considerations of the public in mind
because the law has to presume not only rights, but also obligations
and commitments—commitment to the system that is giving the
right in the first place. Requests of minorities should go hand-inhand with respect for the majority. Likewise, respect for the majority
should go together with respect for the minority. The majority has to
be able to exercise its spectrum of rights and duties, which naturally
made it the majority. Complete secularism leads to the loss of the
moral structure of society, because it will now be prone to being
tectonically moved, shaken, and even attacked.
In S.A.S., there are moral and logical inconsistencies. If the state
does not mind religion and says that it is dedicated to the protection
of human rights, then it is unfair to ask and punish post-festum acts
which were, in a specific formal sense, legal. This produces a specific
kind of retroactivity. It also produces a secular state and by doing so
eliminates all forms of religious life, even for those whose religions
that have been present in the society for ages. This behavior is really
an excuse to attack just one behavior that was unwanted and
considered to be in the widest gap with the dominant culture. In
France, that culture was unjustly abandoned by the developments of
secularism, although it remains very present and alive through the
religious life and activities of the nation itself. Even if people are not
believers, social norms derived from religion and religious norms
influence what behavior is acceptable and what is not. Similarly,
Christian, Islamic, and Jewish norms, cultures, and identities
influence life in the states where those are religions are practiced.
A special problem arises when some groups do not respect the
public order of the country where they live and unchecked human
rights principles are allowed to be practiced fully; this can make
things even more flammable. A combination and balance of public
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order (public morals) and human rights is the only solution.
Minorities should be treated and protected to the maximum possible
level. Freedom should be cherished, as God himself wants us to be
free and to be able to choose. But, the state needs to listen to its
citizens and what they want for their society. This is integral and the
most visible part of the democratic process in the way that laws are
created to public response, which should be non rejectionist.
To be completely clear, human rights should be assured in full,
but should also be tempered by public order so that no one feels
threatened. It does not matter upon what cultural package one
particular county is set. It could be religion or cultural influence x, y,
or z, but every effort should be made to set a minimal standard for
both majority and minority. To use the language from the ECtHR in
Lautsi, there should not be an “abuse of minority position” or a
“despotism of majority,” 168 but rather, a minimal standard for the
rights of both.
In each of these cases from Italy, France, and Croatia, religious
culture is, and for a long time will be, an integral part of the culture
that stands behind those legal systems. By not recognizing the
importance of religion in the cultural context of the nations, states
are not ready to build a clear and fair framework in which all can fit.
The practice of the ECtHR has shown that it is ready to give a wide
margin of appreciation to the particular cultural issues of European
countries. EU law does not regulate family law for the same reasons.
By forcing secularity too strongly, states risk having a bad public
response, which is never good for the stability of government. If the
state does not have a clear position on the norms of public life and
order, it easily can jump into an illogical concept of defending
something without referencing its religious roots. For example,
France defended the ‘living together principle’ which is based on
cultural and religious norms, specifically those of Judeo-Christianity,
but the state never mentioned its roots. 169 It is like having an oldfashioned grandparent who exists, but you do not mention to others
that you have the grandparent because you are ashamed of his oldfashioned ways. A system in which care for the cultural position is

168.
169.

Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 ¶¶ 4, 7.
See S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 153–58.
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clear and at least mildly recognized could be fairer to both majorities
and minorities alike.
Once again, the five steps that have to be acknowledged in order
to apply the NBT Principle or the TBT Principle are:
1. Acknowledging that religion is an important part of the
cultural life of citizens (Awareness);
2. Acknowledging
that
religion
has
shaped
the
culture (Foundations);
3. Securing a minimum of the prevailing set of norms of the
majority by law (Democratic Principle);
4. Giving the maximum possible rights to the minority by law
(Human Rights Principle); and
5. Balancing
between
minority
and
majority
rights (Cohabitation).
If these five principles are followed, states will find that they are
better able to deal with the challenges they face not only between
religious majorities and secular minorities in a growingly diverse
world, but also in all other combinations between secular and
religious groups, and even between religious and secular groups
themselves. Particular religious and secular beliefs are different
among each respective group. Allowing for the maximum possible
level of tolerance and respect for religious expression is not
something that can just be invented or dictated and applied to all
uniformly. Instead, a determination of how to balance interests and
the will to do it will always remain an essential and crucial element,
even within the work of law.
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